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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Appellants Robert A. Elliott, Sr., Justin Love, and Dajwan Ware were convicted of 
various federal crimes in connection with a dogfighting conspiracy.  The conspiracy was 
uncovered by federal agents monitoring wiretaps authorized as part of an investigation 
into Anthony “Monte” Gaines.  Over the course of six weeks beginning in October 2015, 
agents intercepted several days’ worth of conversations between Mr. Gaines and others, 
including Mr. Ware and Mr. Love, regarding various aspects of the dogfighting venture.  
These revelations led to a multi-district investigation into the dogfighting activity, which 
resulted in several convictions, including Appellants’.1  The trial evidence showed that all 
three Appellants maintained dogs that were bred, trained, and kept for fighting; that Mr. 
Ware intended to enter at least one dog in a fight; and that Mr. Love actually entered dogs 
in fights, one of which was recorded in videos found on his cell phone.  Further, 
possession of certain dogs passed between Appellants and their co-conspirators at various 
times.   
Each Appellant now challenges his conviction.  Mr. Ware and Mr. Elliott also 
challenge their sentences.  For the reasons set forth herein, we will affirm the judgment of 
conviction of each Appellant.2 
 
1  Robert Arellano was a co-conspirator tried with Appellants.  He was also 
convicted at trial; he does not appeal his conviction or sentence.  Several defendants, 
including Mr. Gaines, pleaded guilty to crimes related to the conspiracy.     
2  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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I. Appellant Ware 
A. Background  
Mr. Ware resided in Fort Wayne, Indiana.  In June 2016, Agent Christopher 
Golightly signed an affidavit in support of a search warrant of Mr. Ware’s house, which 
was subsequently executed.  Agent Anthony Ruffini wrote the affidavit, though this fact 
was not discernible from the face of the affidavit.  When the search warrant was 
executed, agents found two dogs housed in a manner consistent with their use in 
dogfighting, as well as dogfighting paraphernalia and other evidence related to 
dogfighting.   
Mr. Ware was subsequently charged and tried for conspiracy.  The evidence at 
trial showed that Mr. Ware had received a fighting dog from Mr. Gaines and co-
conspirator Frank Nichols; that Mr. Ware had received a dog from co-conspirator 
Arellano; and that Mr. Ware and Mr. Gaines had exchanged information related to 
dogfighting.   
Another development at trial was Agent Golightly’s admission that the search 
warrant had been ghostwritten by another agent.  Mr. Ware moved for a mistrial, 
asserting that the omission of this information rendered the search warrant defective 
under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).  The District Court denied his motion.   
Mr. Ware was convicted of (i) conspiracy to sponsor and exhibit dogs in animal 
fighting ventures, contrary to 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 49 and in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and (ii) conspiracy to sell, buy, possess, train, transport, deliver, and 
receive dogs for purposes of having the dogs participate in animal fighting ventures, 
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contrary to 7 U.S.C. § 2156(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 49 and in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  
At sentencing, the District Court varied upward from the top of the guidelines range—
fourteen months—to impose a sentence of twenty-four months.   
On appeal, Mr. Ware claims (1) that the search warrant was invalid, so the District 
Court should have granted his motion for a mistrial, and (2) that the District Court erred 
in varying upward at his sentencing because the variance was based solely on the nature 
and circumstances of the offense, was unsupported by evidence, and was excessive.    
B. Validity of Search Warrant 
Where a district court has denied a defendant’s motion for mistrial, we review that 
decision for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Diaz, 592 F.3d 467, 470 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Here, the alleged trial error is a failure to suppress evidence.  We exercise plenary review 
over the legal determinations pertaining to the suppression of evidence, and we review 
the predicate factual findings for clear error. United States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 261 
(3d Cir. 2005).   
When Agent Golightly took the stand, he disclosed for the first time that the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant application had been written by Agent Ruffini 
and that he had signed the document without verifying most of the information contained 
therein.  The affidavit stated that the affiant was “familiar with the facts set forth herein 
based on [his] personal observations, or information provided to him by other law 
enforcement officers participating in this investigation,” and based on his “review of 
documents, reports, and photographs.”  Ware App. 39–40.  When cross-examined, 
however, Agent Golightly admitted that he had not independently reviewed documents, 
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reports, or photographs, other than Mr. Ware’s driver’s license.  Indeed, he did no 
independent investigation prior to signing the search warrant other than surveilling Mr. 
Ware’s house to confirm that Mr. Ware lived there.   
We will affirm the denial of a mistrial.  The fruits of a search must be suppressed 
if a defendant shows that “a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the [search] warrant affidavit, 
and . . . the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.”  
United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 676 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–
56).  When an officer “recklessly omits facts that any reasonable person would know that 
a judge would want to know,” this rises to “reckless disregard for the truth.”  Wilson v. 
Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 783 (3d Cir. 2000).   
Mr. Ware characterizes the omission here thus:  “none of the substantive 
information in the affidavit was based on Golightly’s personal knowledge, but rather 
what Agent Anthony Ruffini told Golightly.”  Ware Br. 12.  We need not determine 
whether Agent Golightly’s omission (or misrepresentation regarding the affiant’s review 
of reports and documentary evidence) constitutes a knowingly false statement or a 
reckless disregard for the truth because it was not a predicate to the probable cause 
finding.  The Supreme Court has held that “[o]bservations of fellow officers of the 
Government engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant 
applied for by one of their number.”  United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 
(1965).  Thus, we find that if the affidavit had fully and completely disclosed Agent 
Ruffini’s role and the nature and extent of Agent Golightly’s investigation, this 
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information would not have affected the probable cause finding.  See United States v. 
Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 2006) (“In the end, the defendant must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that probable cause does not exist under the corrected 
affidavit, i.e., that the deficiency in the affidavit was material to the original probable 
cause finding.”).     
Because the omission here did not impact the probable cause determination, the 
search warrant was valid; the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mr. 
Ware’s motion for a mistrial.   
C. Upward Variance 
We review sentences for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 
558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  “[A]bsent any significant procedural error, we must 
‘give due deference to the district court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors, on a 
whole,’ justify the sentence.”  Id. at 568 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 
(2007)).   
Mr. Ware argues that the District Court’s upward variance violates the precept that 
sentencing must be individualized.  Mr. Ware underscores that if the nature of the crime 
were relied upon to justify an upward variance (as he claims transpired here), such a 
variance would be proper in every dogfighting case.  He urges that in this particular case, 
“there was nothing remotely suggesting that [he] participated or was engaged in the sort 
of extreme dogfighting violence justifying an upward departure as required by” 
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Application Note 2 of the Guidelines Manual.3  Ware Br. 20.  He also submits that he 
“was not involved in the conspiracy to the extent of the other co-defendants, and had a 
minimal criminal record confined to one drug conviction years ago.”  Ware Br.18.   
The District Court, however, explained its basis for the variance in some detail, 
explicitly tying it to the circumstances of Mr. Ware’s individual case.  In addition to 
stating that it had considered the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the District 
Court demonstrated this consideration.  It read into the record excerpts of letters showing 
the positive and commendable “history and characteristics of the defendant,” which it 
apparently credited,4 and it pinpointed evidence supporting its belief that “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense” warranted a variance.  Id. § 3553(a)(1).   
The District Court emphasized that there was evidence of Mr. Ware’s “significant” 
and “substantive[]” involvement in the dogfighting venture, as well as “evidence that this 
dogfighting venture was an ongoing activity in Mr. Ware’s life.”  Ware App. 15, 16.  
These determinations were based on, inter alia, (1) the fact that Mr. Ware had taken 
possession of a dog named “Bubbles” from Mr. Gaines and Mr. Nichols, with the 
 
3  This Application Note states that “an upward departure may be warranted” if “the 
offense level determined under this guideline substantially understates the seriousness of 
the offense,” as where the offense involves extraordinary cruelty or animal fighting on an 
exceptional scale.  U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2E3.1 n.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2018).  The increased sentence here constituted a variance based on the factors set forth 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), not a departure, and therefore this Application Note is 
inapplicable.     
4  The District Court acknowledged that “there are so many good things about . . . 
Mr. Ware[] that you can’t ignore them.”  Ware App. at 17.  Yet in spite of these laudable 
qualities, it reiterated that “in relationship to the depraved conduct that has occurred, it 
seems to me that the guidelines level [is] insufficient.”  Id. at 18.   
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apparent intent to enter her in a specific fight; (2) the fact that Mr. Ware had received a 
dog named “Bull” from Mr. Arellano; (3) various recorded phone calls between Mr. 
Ware and Mr. Gaines, in which they appeared to discuss fighting Bubbles, as well as 
other matters related to fighting, transporting, and selling dogs; and (4) Mr. Ware’s 
possession of nearly 100 photos of dogs, with notes on the back pertaining to the 
dogfighting venture.   
The District Court further stated its belief that the variance was necessary “to 
reflect the seriousness of the offense,” “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct,” and “to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar 
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(B), 
(a)(6).  In the interest of uniformity, the District Court recited the sentences it had 
imposed on other defendants involved in the conspiracy.  Against this backdrop, it 
reiterated that a twenty-four-month sentence “seems to be reasonable when considering 
all the factors.”  Ware App. 20.   
The District Court also expressed a policy disagreement with the Guidelines, 
which undergirded its decision to vary upward: 
I believe this activity of dogfighting ventures is depraved.  It’s inhumane, it’s 
cruel; there’s hardly words to describe it, it’s so horrible in my mind.  So, it 
doesn’t seem to me that the guideline provisions on a guideline level 10, is 
an appropriate measure of the crime in this instance. 
Id. at 16–17; see also id. at 20 (stating that the conduct at issue “needs to have a serious 
penalty with it, and that’s why I’m varying upwards.”).  A district court is permitted to 
“vary from the . . . Guidelines based on [a] policy disagreement with them.”  Spears v. 
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United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009) (per curiam) (emphasis omitted); see also 
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 570; United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 150 (3d Cir. 
2009).   
Notably, “closer review may be in order when the sentencing judge varies from 
the Guidelines based solely on the judge’s view that the Guidelines range ‘fails properly 
to reflect § 3553(a) considerations’ even in a mine-run case.”  Kimbrough v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007)).  
Here, it appears likely that the District Court believed that the Guidelines were too lenient 
even in a typical case under the statute, given that Mr. Ware (who had a minimal criminal 
history) had not been convicted on any substantive count.  Still, our close review reveals 
no basis for reversal.  The District Court provided “a reasoned, coherent, and sufficiently 
compelling explanation of the basis for [its] disagreement,” which was thoroughly 
“grounded in the § 3553(a) factors.”  United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 600 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 220 (3d Cir. 2010)) (alteration in 
original).  Accounting for all the sentencing factors, it explained that “its policy judgment 
would serve the § 3553(a) sentencing goals” (including because a “serious penalty” is 
necessary for “deterrence,” Ware App. 20).5  Grober, 624 F.3d at 600 (quoting Merced, 
603 F.3d at 221).   
 
5  The reasonableness of the District Court’s determination is further demonstrated 
by the fact that in 2016, the United States Sentencing Commission amended the 
Guidelines to raise the base offense level for animal fighting from ten to sixteen.  
Pursuant to this amendment, Mr. Ware’s guideline sentence would have been twenty-four 
to thirty months.  U.S.S.G. § 2E3.1.  Thus, the District Court’s variance comports with 
the Sentencing Commission’s assessment of the penalties commensurate with offenses 
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In summary, the District Court found that Mr. Ware had engaged in “substantial 
activity in furtherance of the animal fighting venture,” including “very substantive 
conduct that deserves 24 months of imprisonment.”  Ware App. 20.  It also deliberately 
calibrated the sentence to be consonant with the sentences imposed on defendants in 
related cases.  The District Court concluded, “this conduct is just extraordinarily 
outrageous and criminal and needs to be punished based on [Mr. Ware’s] activities.”  Id. 
at 21.  On this record, which we review for abuse of discretion, we conclude that the 
variance was based on legitimate, appropriate, and sufficiently individual considerations.  
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in varying upward.   
II. Appellant Elliott 
A. Background 
In June 2016, federal agents searched Mr. Elliott’s residence, where co-conspirator 
Frank Nichols also resided.  There, they discovered thirteen pit bull-type dogs, housed in 
a manner consistent with dogfighting; medical supplies, equipment, and medication; 
documents including registration for dogs and pedigree information; and items such as 
“break sticks” and dog restraining devices.  A pedigree book found in the search 
contained an entry for “Elliott’s Shottsie,” owned by Robert Elliott, and “Arrelano’s 
 
involving an animal fighting venture.  See Sentencing Guidelines for United States 
Courts, 81 Fed. Reg. 27,265 (May 5, 2016) (“The Commission also determined that the 
increased base offense level better accounts for the cruelty and violence that is 
characteristic of these crimes, as reflected in the extensive public comment and 
testimony . . . .”).   
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Sugar.”6  A registry specific to fighting dogs listed Mr. Elliott as the breeder and owner 
for “Elliott’s 2 Face,” which was the offspring of “Elliott’s Cindy” and “Elliott’s Black.”  
Other pedigree records showed that Mr. Elliott had owned and bred numerous dogs.  It 
was stipulated, however, that Mr. Elliott did not own Fancy, one of the dogs found at his 
home.  Rather, the evidence indicated that Mr. Gaines owned Fancy, and she was 
temporarily in the care of Mr. Nichols and Mr. Elliott while they whelped a litter of 
Fancy’s puppies.   
The evidence at trial further showed that Mr. Elliott was mentioned in a call 
between Mr. Nichols and Mr. Gaines.  Mr. Nichols told Mr. Gaines that he and Elliott 
“were trying to find some rolls for these bitches,” referring to a particular type of 
dogfight.  Elliott App. 2656.  Mr. Nichols then said, referring to Mr. Elliott, “he was 
telling me to call you and ask you, . . . could you hook something up for us?”  Id.  On a 
call with Lydell Harris, another co-conspirator, Mr. Gaines mentioned Mr. Elliott, saying, 
“Bob, he so good with them dogs, man, Fancy been off of her puppies after the first week 
and a half, man.”  Elliott App. 2658.   
Mr. Elliott was convicted of (i) one count of conspiracy to sell, buy, possess, train, 
transport, deliver, and receive dogs for purposes of having the dogs participate in animal 
fighting ventures, contrary to 7 U.S.C. § 2156(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 49 and in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 371; and (ii) twelve counts of knowingly possessing a dog for purposes of 
having the dog participate in an animal fighting venture in violation of 7 U.S.C. 
 
6  Despite the misspelling, it appears that this may be a reference to co-conspirator 
Robert Arellano.  See n.1.   
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§ 2156(b), 18 U.S.C. § 49, and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  He was acquitted of conspiracy to sponsor 
and exhibit dogs in an animal fighting venture.     
At sentencing, the District Court found that the twelve convictions for possession 
of dogs should not be “grouped” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.  As a 
result, the District Court imposed a sentence of 24 months.  Had the counts been grouped, 
the maximum sentence under the Guidelines would have been twelve months of 
imprisonment.  See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2015).  
On appeal, Mr. Elliott claims for the first time that (1) the evidence at trial in fact 
proved multiple conspiracies, thus varying from the indictment, and that he was 
prejudiced as a result, and (2) that the District Court’s grouping analysis was erroneous.   
B. Claimed Variance from Indictment  
We “review the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Government, and credit all reasonable inferences that support the verdict[].”  United 
States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 342 (3d Cir. 2002).  Because this claimed error was not 
brought to the District Court’s attention, we will reverse only if it constitutes plain error 
affecting Mr. Elliott’s substantial rights.  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734–35 
(1993).   
Mr. Elliott asserts that at trial, the Government proved at least two conspiracies:  
one involving Messrs. Gaines, Nichols, Arellano, Ware, and Love, and the other 
involving only Messrs. Gaines, Nichols, and Elliott.  See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 
U.S. 750 (1946).  He emphasizes that of the alleged co-conspirators, he had direct contact 
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with only one—Frank Nichols, who in turn interacted with Mr. Gaines on Mr. Elliott’s 
behalf.  Mr. Elliott asserts that there was no evidence at trial showing that he had contact 
with or knowledge of Mr. Arellano, Mr. Love, and Mr. Ware, or more generally that he 
had reason to know the nature or extent of Mr. Gaines’s dogfighting activity.  In contrast, 
he submits, Mr. Arellano, Mr. Love, and Mr. Ware all had direct contact with one another 
and “played related roles in specific dog fighting and dog training activities with Mr. 
Gaines and to a lesser extent with Mr. Nichols.”  Elliott Br. 24–25.   
“A conviction must be vacated when (1) there is a variance between the 
indictment and the proof presented at trial and (2) the variance prejudices a substantial 
right of the defendant.”  United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1989).  Where 
an indictment alleges a single conspiracy but the evidence at trial “proves only the 
existence of multiple conspiracies,” there is a variance.  Id.   
When an appellant claims a variance, “we evaluate whether the record, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the government, contains substantial evidence” that 
defendant was part of a single conspiracy that also included his co-conspirators.  United 
States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 287 (3d Cir. 2007).  “[T]o determine whether a series of 
events constitutes a single conspiracy or separate and unrelated conspiracies,” we:  
(1) “examine whether there was a common goal among the conspirators,” (2) “look at the 
nature of the scheme to determine whether ‘the agreement contemplated bringing to pass 
a continuous result that will not continue without the continuous cooperation of the 
conspirators,’” and (3) “examine the extent to which the participants overlap in the 
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various dealings.”  Kelly, 892 F.2d at 259 (quoting United States v. DeVarona, 872 F.2d 
114, 119 (5th Cir. 1989)).   
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the 
record contains substantial evidence that Mr. Elliott and his alleged co-conspirators, 
including his co-defendants, joined a single conspiracy to sell, buy, possess, train, 
transport, deliver, and receive dogs for the purpose of having the dogs participate in an 
animal fighting venture.    
First, the evidence supports a finding that the co-conspirators shared a common 
goal, to wit:  advancing dogfighting activities, specifically by possessing, receiving, 
selling, conveying, or training dogs for fighting.  Mr. Elliott does not appear to contest 
this.    
Second, the agreement contemplated bringing to pass a continuous result that 
required the cooperation of all the conspirators, including Mr. Elliott.  The trial evidence 
showed that at one point Mr. Elliott possessed twelve dogs, not including Fancy, that 
were being raised to fight, and that he weaned Fancy’s puppies for Mr. Gaines.  At trial, 
an expert witness testified that individuals involved in dogfighting “typically want to 
have more animals than not, so that they can refresh their yard or they can breed, and so 
that they have a selection or variety.”  Elliott App. 1633.  The same witness testified to 
the importance of pedigree for those seeking to acquire new fighting dogs.   
Weaning the offspring of Fancy, an experienced fighting dog, enabled the 
purchases, further breeding, and actual fighting that were essential to this common 
venture.  Maintaining other dogs—whether to present as opponents in fights or to sell or 
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use for breeding—is similarly integral to the continuous result contemplated: moving, 
training, and keeping dogs for animal fighting ventures.  In other words, Elliott’s 
activities were “necessary or advantageous to . . . . the overall success of the venture” in 
which all his co-defendants were engaged.  Kelly, 892 F.3d at 259 (quoting DeVarona, 
872 F.2d at 118).  The evidence showed that Mr. Elliott also relied on other parties to the 
conspiracy, as when he (through Mr. Nichols) asked Mr. Gaines to help them find 
dogfights for the dogs in their possession.      
Finally, this is not a classic “rimless wheel” conspiracy where the co-conspirators 
are connected to one another only via the central actor—the “hub.”  See Kotteakos, 328 
U.S. at 754–55.  Rather, the activities of the co-conspirators overlapped significantly.  
For instance, Mr. Nichols and Mr. Gaines transported a dog to Mr. Ware, and Mr. 
Arellano sold and conveyed dogs to Mr. Gaines, Mr. Love, and Mr. Ware.   
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Mr. Elliott’s conspiracy conviction.   
C. Application of Grouping Rules 
Because Mr. Elliott did not object to the application of the grouping rules at trial, 
we review the sentence for plain error.  Olano, 507 U.S. at 734–35.   
When sentencing Mr. Elliott, the District Court noted that the Third Circuit has yet 
to decide whether dogs qualify as “victims” for sentencing purposes, such that crimes 
involving different dogs are not grouped under § 3D1.2 of the Guidelines.  In light of 
this, it provided an alternative basis for its sentence: 
[I]f the event occurs that the presentence report as I have adopted [it] is not 
accepted by the Third Circuit because they think that the possession of the 
dogs should be grouped, my rationale on the 24 months would stay the same.  
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With Mr. Elliott, he was a 10, which was—I think the max was 14 months; 
and I added 10 months to get to the 24.   
I would do the same if I had Mr. Elliott and his guidelines was a 10 rather 
than a 15, I would impose a sentence of 14 months and I would add 10 as an 
upward variance, because the guidelines do not reflect the seriousness of the 
offense.  So under either circumstance[] I would maintain that the sentence 
that I imposed here is appropriate. 
Elliott App. 2547.    
In fact, if Mr. Elliott’s base offense level were a ten, the Guidelines range would 
have been six to twelve months given his criminal history category of I.  U.S. SENT’G 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2015).  Still, the District Court’s 
statement that it would vary upward “to get to” the twenty-four-month sentence indicates 
that it viewed this as the appropriate sentence after application of the § 3553(a) factors.    
Indeed, the District Court explained its decision not to vary from that sentence 
because, inter alia, it believed the twenty-four-month sentence avoided “unwarranted 
sentencing disparities between Mr. Elliott and other folks that were involved in this 
conspiracy.”  Elliott App. 2544.  It stated that Mr. Elliott’s conduct was, in its view, 
“similar to [that of] Mr. Ware,” Elliott App. 2545, who also received a twenty-four-
month sentence.  
Because the District Court expressly stated that it would have imposed the same 
sentence even if the counts were grouped, Mr. Elliott was not prejudiced by the grouping 
analysis.  Thus, we will not disturb the sentence on plain error review.  See Olano, 507 
U.S. at 734–35.   
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III. Appellant Love   
A. Background 
Mr. Love was convicted of (i) conspiracy to sponsor and exhibit dogs in animal 
fighting ventures, contrary to 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 49 and in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (ii) conspiracy to sell, buy, possess, train, transport, deliver, and 
receive dogs for purposes of having the dogs participate in animal fighting ventures, 
contrary to 7 U.S.C. § 2156(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 49 and in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; 
(iii) two counts of knowingly purchasing and receiving a dog for purposes of having the 
dog participate in an animal fighting venture, contrary to 7 U.S.C. § 2156(b), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 49, and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (iv) six counts of knowingly possessing a dog for purposes 
of having the dog participate in an animal fighting venture, contrary to 7 U.S.C. 
§ 2156(b), 18 U.S.C. § 49, and 18 U.S.C. § 2.     
At trial, Mr. Love attempted to establish that his participation in the conspiracy 
was in his capacity as an informant in a dogfighting investigation.   Specifically, Mr. 
Love sought to develop the theory that he had cooperated with Larry Donato, then a New 
Jersey SPCA officer, when he “engaged in activities designed to cultivate information 
about dog fighting ventures and persons involved in illegal dog fighting activities.”  Love 
App. 116a.  The Government argued that Mr. Love was asserting a public authority 
defense and that he had failed to comply with the notice requirements set forth in Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.3.   
This rule prescribes the procedures to be followed “[i]f a defendant intends to 
assert a defense of actual or believed exercise of public authority on behalf of a law 
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enforcement agency or federal intelligence agency at the time of the alleged defense.”  
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.3(a)(1).  The rule requires the defendant to inform the prosecution of 
her intent to assert the defense “within the time provided for filing a pretrial motion.”  Id.  
It also permits the government to make a written request, before trial, for the defendant to 
disclose the identity of witnesses upon whom the defendant intends to rely to establish 
the defense.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.3(a)(4). 
On the fourth day of trial, the Government petitioned the District Court to preclude 
the testimony of any witnesses who would have testified in support of a public authority 
defense, including “Government witnesses who have been subject to cross-examination 
under this theory.”  Love App. 31a.  When the issue was first raised, Mr. Love’s counsel, 
Mr. Powell, argued that Rule 12.3 was inapplicable.  In a written submission and 
subsequent oral presentations, Mr. Powell explained that Mr. Love sought to assert an 
“innocent intent” defense, as opposed to a public authority defense.7     
The District Court initially denied the Government’s motion, which the 
Government subsequently renewed multiple times.  The first renewal was based on new 
discovery the Government had obtained from Mr. Powell, including text messages in 
which Mr. Love appeared to tell Mr. Donato that he was working for a federal 
government employee.  The District Court deemed the issue unripe and declined to rule 
on the renewed motion.  The Government next raised the issue at a sidebar while Mr. 
 
7  In this letter motion, Mr. Powell further maintained that the lack of prior notice 
had not caused prejudice to the Government and that Mr. Love should be permitted to 
develop the public authority defense.  However, Mr. Powell maintained consistently that 
Mr. Love was not asserting a public authority defense and would not do so.   
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Love was on the stand, after Mr. Powell had asked him various permutations of the 
question:  “Everything that we’ve seen in the case that relates to you, to your 
understanding were those all activities undertaken by you at the behest of Mr. Donato?”  
Elliott App. 2234–35.  Prior to this sidebar, Mr. Love had also testified about unproduced 
emails with Donato and had discussed his interactions with “an alleged public official 
named John for whom [the defense] ha[d] a recording that [the Government] never 
received.”8  Love App. 92a.  The District Court did not rule on the motion at this time.     
After Mr. Love’s testimony had concluded, the District Court found he had 
certainly “asserted an actual exercise of public authority.”  Love App. 103a.  The District 
Court granted the Government’s renewed motion.     
The immediate result of this ruling was the preclusion of certain testimony of 
Special Agent Nicholas Tranchitella.  Mr. Powell had proffered that Agent Tranchitella’s 
testimony would be relevant “as to whether or not he had an opportunity to interview Mr. 
Donato and as to whether or not Mr. Donato is actually a real person and a real former 
employee of the SPCA.”  Love App. 101a.  The District Court also charged the jury 
regarding the public authority defense, over Mr. Powell’s objection, and did not instruct 
the jury regarding an innocent intent defense.  In its jury charge, the District Court stated 
that Mr. Love should not be found guilty if the jury were to find that (1) a government 
official directed Mr. Love to engage in the conduct charged against him, (2) the official 
 
8  More broadly, Mr. Love had also testified throughout his direct examination about 
the informant relationship he had purportedly developed with Mr. Donato and other 
police officers, as well as the actions he took to further these relationships.     
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had actual or apparent authority to grant such authorization, and (3) in engaging in the 
conduct, Mr. Love reasonably relied on the official’s actual or apparent authorization.     
Mr. Love claims that the District Court erred in treating his theory as a public 
authority defense and therefore erred in excluding a defense witness and charging the 
jury on a public authority defense but not an innocent intent defense.  In the alternative, 
he argues that he did have a viable public authority defense, and his counsel was 
ineffective in failing to pursue that defense (including by failing to follow the prescribed 
procedures).     
B. Rulings Pursuant to Rule 12.3 
We review the district court’s exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion, and 
we apply the same standard to jury instructions.  United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 
348 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 74 (3d Cir. 2008); Glass v. 
Phila. Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1994).  “Evidentiary errors objected to at trial 
are reviewed for harmless error”; error is harmless if “it is highly probable that the error 
did not affect the result.”  United States v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 352 (3d Cir. 2011)).  An erroneous 
jury instruction issued over the defendant’s contemporaneous objection will be upheld 
only if “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Cordaro v. United States, 933 F.3d 232, 
245 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 155 (3d Cir. 2019)).   
1. Exclusion of Evidence 
It is highly probable that the exclusion of Agent Tranchitella’s testimony did not 
affect the result in this case, so any error was harmless.  The innocent intent defense 
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implicates the defendant’s mental state; it asserts that the requisite mens rea was lacking.  
See United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1368 n.18 (11th Cir. 1994).  Mr. 
Powell explicitly disclaimed any intention to elicit testimony about the “nature of the 
conversation between Special Agent Tranchitella and Larry Donato,” but he maintained 
that Agent Tranchitella’s testimony would have been relevant to establish Mr. Donato’s 
actual existence and erstwhile employment by the SPCA.  Love App. 101a.  These 
facts—that Mr. Donato is not fiction or figment, and that he was indeed an SPCA 
employee9—are not particularly probative of Mr. Love’s mental state.  See United States 
v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508, 1517–19 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Appellants’ claim of innocent 
intent was adequately raised without the [excluded] material,” which “added little, if 
anything, to the plausibility of their claim”; further, excluded material was likely to 
confuse or mislead the jury and therefore was properly excluded under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403).   
Indeed, the substantial relevance of the testimony would have been to support a 
public authority defense.  Of course, Mr. Love maintains that he did not seek to mount 
such a defense.  More to the point, if he did intend to do so, the exclusion of the 
testimony would have been proper pursuant to Rule 12.3 because Mr. Love did not 
provide the requisite notice under the rule.   
 
9  The Government did not attempt to contest these facts.  For instance, it made no 
objection to Mr. Powell’s discussing, during redirect examination of Mr. Love, the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office having interviewed Mr. Donato.   
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2. Jury Instructions 
Mr. Love was not prejudiced by the District Court’s delivery of a jury instruction 
on the public authority defense.  Though he argues that the instruction imposed on him “a 
burden of proof on a defense that was not his,” Love Br. 49, he was required to shoulder 
this burden only if he intended to make out a public authority defense.  See United States 
v. Sanders, 962 F.2d 660, 675–76 (7th Cir. 1992) (court did not err in delivering 
instruction on coercion defense where defendants did not assert this defense and facts did 
not support coercion as a matter of law, but nonetheless the evidence “may have raised a 
question about coercion in the jury’s mind,” and the instruction “address[ed] possible 
doubt on this issue”); see also Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233–34 (1987) (due process 
clause not violated where defendant was required to prove self-defense, even though 
elements of crime and of self-defense overlap).  If he did not seek to raise the defense to 
begin with, the instruction did not alter his onus.  Indeed, the District Court properly 
instructed the jury that “each defendant is presumed innocent and he is not required to 
present any evidence or produce any witnesses.”  Elliott App. 2449.   
We do not here insinuate that a superfluous jury instruction on an affirmative 
defense will always be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  It may well be that, on the 
facts of a particular case, the administration of a superfluous instruction could confuse the 
jury or unfairly color the jury’s perception of the evidence.  Here, however, Mr. Love has 
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not identified any source of prejudice other than burden-allocation, and we find none.10  
In this case, therefore, the instruction given was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.     
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in declining to charge the jury on an 
innocent intent defense.  Innocent intent is not an affirmative defense, but rather an 
assertion that the prosecution has not borne its burden in proving the requisite mens rea.  
Thus, specific jury instructions were not required.   
In United States v. Gross, this Court, aligning itself with the majority of circuits to 
have addressed the issue, held that “the good faith defense instruction is merely 
surplusage”; it is “simply a reiteration that the government must carry its burden in 
demonstrating that the accused acted knowingly and willfully.”  961 F.2d 1097, 1103 (3d 
Cir. 1992).11  In Gross, we determined that “[b]y giving a detailed instruction on the 
elements of the crime with which Gross was charged, the court ensured that a jury finding 
of good faith would lead to an acquittal.”  961 F.2d at 1103.  So too here:  no additional 
instruction was necessary to facilitate a finding that Mr. Love had an “innocent intent” 
and therefore lacked the requisite mens rea.    
 
10  If anything, the instruction delivered (which did not refer to a federal government 
official and which encompassed apparent as well as actual authority) may have been 
more favorable to Mr. Love than the instruction requested (which would have required 
the imprimatur of a federal official, as discussed below).  Compare Elliott App. 2479–80 
with Love App. 108a and Fed. Crim. Jury Instr. 7th Cir. 6.07 (2020 ed.)  
11  Like the innocent intent defense, the good faith defense is essentially an assertion 
that the defendant lacked the specific intent that is an element of the charged crime; they 
are different terms for the same theory.  Compare United States v. Xiong, 914 F.3d 1154, 
1159–60 (8th Cir. 2019), with Gross, 961 F.2d at 1100.   
24 
 
Further, the particular instruction Mr. Powell sought was inapposite.  Counsel 
specifically sought an instruction based on the Seventh Circuit’s model jury charge for 
“Entrapment by Estoppel.”  The Seventh Circuit has held that the “Entrapment by 
Estoppel” defense is very narrow and “does not apply when a defendant charged with a 
federal crime claims to have been misled by a state official.”  United States v. Baker, 438 
F.3d 749, 755 (7th Cir. 2006).  Indeed, the model jury instruction lists the first element of 
this defense thus:  “An official of the United States government, with actual or apparent 
authority over the matter, told the defendant that his conduct would be lawful.”  Fed. 
Crim. Jury Instr. 7th Cir. 6.07 (2020 ed.) (emphasis added).  The District Court did not 
err in declining to deliver this instruction.   
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
This Court has expressed a “strong preference for reviewing allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather 
than on direct appeal.”  United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(collecting cases).  We have recognized a narrow exception to this general rule where the 
trial record is sufficiently developed to permit resolution of the issues on appeal.  See 
United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991).   
Here, as the District Court noted, a hearing would be necessary to fully develop 
the record regarding Mr. Powell’s performance and strategy.  Accordingly, the challenge 
is more properly taken up in a collateral proceeding, and we will not reach the issue on 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgments of 
conviction.   
